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ABSTRACT: Horowitz (2000) http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleid.17180/article_detail.asp argues that
politics should be viewed as war; participants in political discourse should be defined as friends or enemies;
and arguments should be viewed largely as weapons. This makes valuing dissensus and a search for
common ground naïve at best, and counterproductive and useless at worse. This essay will explore the
nature of Horowitz’ position and the future search for common ground needed for the valuing of dissensus.
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Dissensus is often not valued. Either because of the interpersonal discomfort caused by
disagreement, or the rush to closure found in many policy contexts, dissensus is
frequently devalued during times of policy consideration. While the Challenger accident
in the late 1980’s gave rise to the initial program for valuing dissensus, the suppression of
concerns about falling insulating foam that gave rise to the Shuttle Columbia accident
indicated that the culture of closure continued to be alive and well among the leadership
of NASA. Willard and Hynes have argued that interpretations of power, of group
identity, of organizational climate, and other issues can be usefully understood within the
framework of valuing dissensus.
There has emerged a recent challenge to this program (or at least recent
application of the challenge in the context of current American political argument). This
challenge comes from a position that advocates significant limits to the discovery of
common grounds for argument among advocates on certain issues of public policy. The
view was first advanced by Horowitz (2000). According to this perspective, politics
should be viewed as war, and participants in political discourse should be consistently
defined as friends or enemies. And a value for dissensus requires the discovery of
common ground. When, as Horowitz suggests, argument is viewed as simply a
convenient weapon in a political war, it makes both valuing dissensus and a search for
common ground for arguers naïve at best, if not impossible and counterproductive.
This essay will explore the nature of Horowitz’ position and the future search for
common ground needed for the valuing of dissensus. This will be done in three parts.
First, we will summarize earlier work characterized as a case for “valuing dissensus.”
Second, we will outline some current political work whose focus undermines the broader
epistemic value for argument and dissensus. Finally, we will consider the consequences
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of this turn, and ways that advocates can unpack value from dissensus within those
constraints.
GENERAL SUMMARY OF WILLARD AND HYNES VALUING DISSENSUS
To say that disagreement is not often valued is an enormous understatement. Either
because of the interpersonal discomfort caused by disagreement, or the rush to closure
found in many policy contexts, Dissensus is not often valued during times of decision
making.
The program consists of a series of essays that develop an extensive, but still
emerging research agenda. These essays include the following: Hynes and Willard,
1996; Hynes, 1995b; Hynes, 1992; Hynes, 1991; Hynes, 1990; Hynes and Willihnganz,
1990; Hynes, 1988; Willard, 1989. The program developed through observations about
assumptions that appeared to operate within a variety of organizations. (These are
summarized in Hynes, 1995b) First, argument can serve important epistemic functions—
people entering into arguments do so with the expectation that based on that interaction,
new configurations of information would emerge. (You say x. I say y, which is not x. We
give reasons to support our respective views, and we may even come to an agreement that
z is true).
Second, Dissensus need not affect the valuing of individuals involved in the
interaction. Individuals who enter into such interactions do so with some level of respect
for those with whom they engage in disagreement.
Third, communities may be defined by the value to which they attach dissensus.
If observers have a notion of the degree to which dissensus is valued with a particular
group, they can predict the general response to disagreement-acceptance, verbal
responses, sanctions or rewards.
Fourth, dissensus is not valued widely. In spite of the credit to dialectic and
decision-making given in critical thinking circles or informal logic courses, various
elements in organizations undermine the duration of, the intensity of, and the
effectiveness of dissensus. Three factors dominate this preference toward consensus: 1) a
conversational structure that prefers agreement; 2) a psychological preference for
niceness and harmony; 3) organizational momentum. Each of these contributes to what
Willard has named the “completion ethic.”
To date, the program has identified the implications of this preference on
agreement on considerations of power, on organizational decision making, on feminist
views of argument as male dominated discourse, among other applications.
There has emerged a recent challenge to program (or at least recent application of
the challenge in the context of current American political argument). This challenge
comes from two distinguishable though connected positions that argue for the limits to
the grounds for argument on certain issues of public policy.
1) Politics should be viewed as war, and participants in political discourse should be
consistently defined as friends or enemies.
2) Some enemies are evil. The valuing of arguments originating with evil rhetors
can be accepted at only great peril. Arguers who engage evil rhetors are naïve at
best, and allow evil to prosper and succeed at worst.
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POLITICS AS WAR, AND THE VALUE OF DISSENSUS
Initially articulated by David Horowitz as an explanation for why Republican advocates
had failed to make any inroads into Democratic (or more precisely, Bill Clinton)
positions, “Full Contact Politics” described a strategy to be taken by Republican
advocates to succeed politically. To cite Horowitz, “Despite the most deeply flawed
Presidency of the Twentieth Century and the worst White House scandal since Watergate,
Clinton is popular because he remade his party both tactically and ideologically into a
much more sensible faction (against the will of its old guard.)” (Horowitz, 2000)
Articulated by Horowitz—the perspective is what Horowitz purports to represent the
positions of then President Clinton and his administration. Or, “six principles of politics
that the Left understands but conservatives do not.”
Ramton and Staub report that Horowitz work was distributed by Tom DeLay to
every Republican member of the US Congress, and distributed by the Heritage
Foundation to some 2300 conservative activists nation wide.(p3))
What follows are brief summaries of these six principles Horowitz advances.
1. Politics is war conducted by other means—in political warfare you do not fight
just to prevail in an argument, but to destroy the enemy’s ability to fight.” “In
political conflicts, the goal is not to refute your opponent’s argument, but to wipe
him from the face of the earth.” Horowitz argues that to understand political
argumentation, models such as Oxford debate—winning related to the relative
strength of arguments and the clarity of the support used to defend them—are bad
models. Time constraints of modern media, attention limits of contemporary
audiences, make it imperative to win quickly and decisively.
2. Politics is a war of position—in war there are two sides: friends and enemies.
“Your task is to define yourself as a friend of as large a contingency compatible
with your principles as possible, while defining your opponent as their enemy
wherever and whenever you can.” This, Horowitz argues, must be done without
appearing to be mean spirited, given American’s valuing of “fairness.” Such a
position increases the possibility of linking positions of opponents with “forces of
evil,” where an advocate can avoid clarifying whether the political opponent is
evil, or whether the opponents’ naivety will allow evil to triumph.
3. In political wars, the aggressor usually prevails. As Horowitz claims: “By
striking first, you can define the issues and define your adversary. Definition is
the decisive move in all political wars. Other things being equal, whoever winds
up on the defensive will generally be on the losing side.” On the surface, this
advocacy for the initiation of argument would seem to support valuing dissensus.
On the contrary, the role of the aggressor would stake out adversarial actions in
locations where dissensus would least likely to usefully bring balance to complex
political positions.
4. Position is defined by fear and hope—those who provide hope are friends, those
who inspire fear become enemies—and if you are defined negatively enough, you
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will lose your ability to offer hope. This position portends arguments aimed at
creating fear of those who would ignore the power of evil in the modern world.
Such naivety is to be feared, since it would leave many helpless in the face of
unknown assaults of “evil doers.” An ironic example appeared after the 2002
State of the Union Address. “After the Bitter after being snubbed for membership
in the "Axis of Evil," Libya, China, and Syria today announced they had formed
the "Axis of Just as Evil," which they said would be way eviler than that stupid
Iran-Iraq-North Korea axis President Bush warned of his State of the Union
address. the story was written by Andrew Marlatt. It first appeared on SatireWire
on Feb. 1, 2002, and was subsequently published in several major newspapers,
including this version still available at The Washington Post.
http://www.satirewire.com/news/jan02/axis.shtml
5. The weapons of politics are symbols that evoke hope and fear. Slogans are
particularly effective, insofar as they limit access to refutation, and provide a
context for a repeated and reinforced message. And in most cases, the repetition
of a slogan in the face of a response will not constitute dissensus that can be
expanded beyond the initial utterances.
6. Victory lies on the side of the people—individuals must be defined in terms that a
broader public can understand. As examples, Horowitz points to justice, fairness,
and individual freedom. Each of these can be conceptualized a relatively simple
ways, and for each political opponents can be cast as opponents of these largely
public values. Horowitz, 2000.
Recently, Wolfe opined in the Chronicle of Higher Education that current conservative
argument strategies strongly resembled the positions advanced by the late German
philosopher Carl Schmitt. Given Horowitz’ second rule, this connection reflects no
stretch at all. Schmitt’s concept of the political is derived from his reactions to the fate of
Germany at the end of World War I, and his reactions to what he perceived were the
limitations of liberalism and pluralism operating in the Weimer Republic. It reflects
Schmitt’s belief that any understanding of the state required an understanding of the
political. Politics, like other concepts such as economics, aesthetics, and moral, are
defined by key distinctions. For economics, it would be profit and loss; for aesthetics it
would be beautiful and ugly; for morality it would be good and evil; and for politics it
would be friend or enemy. According to Schmitt; “ (p. 27) The political enemy need not
be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor…But
he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he
is…existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with
him are possible. These can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm
nor by a judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party.” He continued: (p,
49) “As long as a people exists in a political sphere, this people must, even if only in the
most extreme case…determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy.”
Also an indictment of those Schmitt label political romantic, he argues that the
alternative to his scheme is the failure of the state to make decisions. Not only should
political disputes be seen as conflicts between friends and enemies. Schmitt holds out
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little prospect that debate assumed to be among peaceful participants hold much chance
for success. “In the endless conversation of political romantic, no political decision is
ever made. No commitment is undertaken, no responsibility assumed, and nothing in
political reality is ever changed.” As one of his translators continues, according to
Schmitt, “Discussion or conversation is the vehicle by which the romantic imagination
plays with political values, sublimating them as points of view or feelings, and
suspending the opposition between them in an emotionally satisfying inner synthesis that
transcends the world of real political conflict. As a result, political issues become the
occasion of something that is not political: the creative play of the Wortspiel, the play
with words, which has as its purpose the delight taken in the game itself.” (Schmidt,
1989, xxvii.)
One final perspective of Schmitt bears on current threats to a valuing of
Dissensus—namely, the view that man is evil, and he and his/her arguments are not to be
trusted. As Schmitt observes: “(p. 61) what remains is the remarkable and, for many,
certainly disquieting diagnosis that all genuine political theories presuppose man to be
evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic thinker.”
EVIL AND THE VALUE OF DISSENSUS.
Consistent with the Schmitt’s concern with evil, recent political commentators have
advanced the view that evil changes the ways in which advocacy should be interpreted.
This discussion of evil is powerfully connected to Horowitz’ outline for political
advocates. The general position is as follows. Evil is a real and significant force in the
world. Argument in most conventional senses is not possible in the face of evil people.
They are not likely to provide reliable information when involved in argument. They are
not likely to continue to engage in argument except when it suits their own evil ends.
And since the goal of evil people is to do harm to others, engaging evil in argument is
naïve at best and more likely supporting the cause of evil. The liberal perspective,
because of its inability to account for evil in its analysis of political argument, is not to be
entirely trusted. “No thinking person can fail to recognize the prevalence of evil and
wickedness as a highly significant fact that must be taken into account by all political
moralities. One fundamental defect of liberalism is its naiveté about evil and
wickedness.”( Kekes, 1997, 201-202)
Noted media commentator Sean Hannity states the position rooted in Horowitz’
fourth principle very well. “Like Neville Chamberlain, today’s appeasers are fooling
themselves about the realities of War. They insist that the avenue to ‘peace in our time’ is
through accommodating and pacifying the enemy. They refuse to understand the inherent
moral corruption of totalitarian regimes like Saddam’s, of terrorist networks like bin
Laden’s. They reject the very notion of evil, grasping instead at sociological explanations
and psychological excuses. But just as it is a grave error to mistake evil for insanity, it is
suicidal to approach evil from a position of weakness. Like the mouse that freezes at the
sight of the snake, hoping it will go away, the appeaser just doesn’t understand the nature
of his foe.” Arguers who work from positions of naivety both justify fear, as well as
reinforce our later claim that argument critics must be especially sensitive to ad hominem
argument under such circumstances. (Hannity, 2004, p. 52-53)
Political pundit Michael Savage is less kind:
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The mouthpieces of the left would have you believe they, along with their programs and agenda,
are the answer to what ails America. They’re wrong. Extreme liberalism, as I have demonstrated,
is either treason or insanity. Take your pick. Either way, left unchecked, we are finished. (Savage,
2003, p 233)

Thus we are left with the following: politics is war, and we have either friends or enemies
within the context of such conflicts. To label our enemy in such a way as to limit his/her
access to a public creates an incredible benefit for the advocate. And by attributing evil
motives to some actors, advocates can dismiss all counter advocacy that might be
associated with those opponents. In any case, dissensus that might be valued to create
chances for improved decisions or more informed evaluators of arguments for decisions
is dismissed. The final section of this essay offers some possible ways to potentially
salvage a value for dissensus within even this public climate.
POLITICS AS WAR AND THE VALUING OF DISSENSUS
Let me advance here four potential ways of viewing dissensus within the context created
by Horowitz and others sharing many of his political beliefs.
1) The value of Dissensus may be improved. To consider politics as war, and
arguments as weapons in the arsenal may lead to incremental increases in the
demand the argument must be an essential part of any political action. As
suggested above there are potential and significant barriers to such movements.
First, internal disputes could become the equivalence of friendly fire—perhaps an
inevitable part of any war, but nonetheless occurrences that give rise to
investigations, charges of incompetence and threats of disciplinary actions.
Second, to date, disagreement has taken the form of selective exposure. Partisans
heavily involved in the battle have sought out texts supportive of their own
positions. Thus, with few exceptions, Hannity’s measured comparison of George
W. Bush as Churchill, ( and appropriately, recent scholarly analysis of Iraq’s past
characterizing Saddam Hussein’s rise to power being an inevitable consequence
of Churchill’s actions in the 20’s, and his efforts to continue empire “on the
cheap.” Or Rampton and Stauber’s claim that the politics as war metaphor was
being advocated exclusively by David Horowitz is scrutinize only by those
already prepared to accept these claims. In other words, advocates even under
these circumstances may be under increased pressure to examine sources of
authority or historical analogy which have been used to buttress claims made by
advocates at war—checking the “ammunition” may lead to greater valuing of
dissensus’ tools.
2) Dissensus can still be valued among friends—the conduct of war, for example,
can be subject to a process that values disagreement. In some ways the dispute
over tactical and strategic choices of the war on terror might be considerably
improved, even if one discounts opponents to such war as enemies. This benefit,
sadly, is limited. As noted previously, this Dissensus could only be valued in a
private or at best technical setting out of fear of accusations of either disloyalty or
accusations of naiveté they” are capable of understanding “good reasons.” Limits
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can be set to the definition of evil—in other word, even if the existence of evil is
accepted as outside of disagreements values, legitimate arguments can be applied
to best ways to address its control or containment—the on-going debate about the
application of resources to Sudan instead of other UN projects. “During both the
Holocaust and the Rwanda genocide, warnings were received and ignored. Today
we say "never again." The question now is whether we will ignore the warnings
while the Africans of Darfur perish and then -- once again -- say "never again."
(Fowler, 2004) Or will we act while lives can still be saved It may also be the
case that the web will be used to provide pictures of behavior that might turn evil
in real time, and create visual tools for combating or identifying “evil. So, for
example, Amnesty International “…invited people around the world to log on to
www.eyesondarfur.org, which will be updated regularly with new photographs,
and help it monitor 12 vulnerable villages and put Khartoum on notice that these
areas are being watched closely for signs of any further violence.” Found at
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,132624-pg,1/article.html
3) Attack conditions include some natural limits. In the same way that Willard and I
argue that the preference toward completion will inevitable bring argument to a
close (Willard, 1989, pp 123-127) so too the public preference against
“unfairness” might limit long term a scorched earth set of rules of Dissensus. As
Howowitz writes:” American politics takes place in a pluralistic framework,
where constituencies are diverse and often in conflict. Therefore ‘fairness’ and
tolerance’ are the formal rules of democratic engagement. If you appear mean
spirited, nasty, or too judgmental, it will make the task easier for your opponent to
define you as a threat….”
4) If Dissensus is to be valued, the resources for all sides of the disagreement must
be better balanced. Ramton and Staub provide considerable detail on the efforts
over the last 30 years to strengthen the research and policy argument resources for
the support of neoconservative argument. P32 budget of 146.5 million, Heritage
Foundation described as the “shock troops of the conservative revolution. (p. 33)
Beginning with recent activities of such groups as Moveon.com, research that can
create opportunities for more extensive (and better researched) dissensus may be
the result.
As Willard and I have argued for nearly two decades, there are many reasons for valuing
dissensus and many forces competing to undermine those values. Horowitz’ strategy for
framing arguments in the context of political warfare, as well as framing opponents as
either evil or dupes of evil compounds earlier challenges. Nonetheless, any focus that
brings attention to the potential use of dissensus in framing public policy can serve as an
advantage in the broader epistemic goal. The third section of the essay offers hope that
such positive outcomes can occur.
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